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In this article, I argue that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution makes a foundational 
contribution to International Relations (IR), yet has been relatively under appreciated by the broader 
discipline. Within the Historical Sociology of International Relations, uneven and combined 
development has recently been postulated as a key trans-historical law that provides a social theory of 
the ‘international’. Drawing from, but moving beyond these debates, I will argue that passive 
revolution is a key conditioning factor of capitalist modernity. I will demonstrate how the concept of 
passive revolution is the element that explains the connection between the universal process of uneven 
development and the manner in which specific combinations occur within the capitalist era as geo-
political pressures, in tandem with domestic social forces become internalised into geographically 
specific state forms. It therefore offers a corrective to the frequently aspatial view that is found in 
much of the literature in IR regarding uneven and combined development. Additionally, passive 
revolution provides a more politicised understanding of the present as well as an important theoretical 
lesson in relation to what needs to be done to affect alternative trajectories of development.  
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The title of this article takes its cue from a remark by Antonio Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks 
regarding what he calls ‘universal concepts with geographical seats’.1 In the context of his writing, 
Gramsci is discussing Italy and its lack of a fully developed national culture. Instead, he reflected, the 
peninsula was influenced by the cosmopolitanism of a small elite who remained detached from the 
masses.2 In this article, I utilise both the generalised method of examining a social formation within 
the broader global context of which it is both constitutive and constituted by, but also the specific 
class basis for the national developmental projects of countries. I draw attention to how - throughout 
modernity - passive revolution has been a persistent and universal feature of developmental change. 
However, the way it manifests itself and unfolds has differed depending on the particular country or 
region involved. It is a process, therefore, that has been structurally conditioned by the broader global 
political economy, yet contingently articulated in various contexts giving the term its geographical 
seats.  
 
Fred Halliday once opined that the study of revolution had been neglected within International 
Relations. He proposed that any such future enquiry should comprise the following three areas: 1) 
locating the place of revolutions and explaining their influence on the international system more 
broadly, 2) exploring the international dimensions of any revolution and 3) reflecting on what 
theoretical issues the study of revolutions pose.3 In this article I will contend that Gramsci’s concept 
of passive revolution allows us to do all of these tasks. Namely, it informs us of the dialectic 
relationship between national (and subnational) state formation and the international context (and 
subsequent ramifications that change brings). It also allows us to draw theoretical lessons from this 
with regards to a political strategy for emancipation by learning from history. In contrast to those who 
                                                          
1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated and edited by Quentin Hoare and Graham 
Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p.117, Q10II§61. I have followed the international 
standard for referring to Gramsci’s work using the notebook (Q) as well as the note number (§). The 
concordance table for this can be found of the International Gramsci Society website - 
http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org  
2 Peter Ives and Nicola Short, ‘On Gramsci and the international: a textual analysis’, Review of International 
Studies, 39: 3 (2013), p.638. 
3 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.127-8. 
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have sought to dismiss Gramsci as a theorist only of national politics,4 this article therefore adds 
weight to the claim that Gramsci offers a foundational contribution to the study of international 
relations.5 The concept of passive revolution, moreover, is stressed to be a key complement to the 
notion of uneven and combined development (U&CD) that has recently gained purchase as an 
analytical category within the Historical Sociology of International Relations (HSIR).  It will be 
argued that passive revolution helps to enhance and give wider political resonance to this latter 
concept, explaining the connection between wider processes of uneven development and the specific 
manner in which combination occurs during the capitalist epoch, as geo-political pressures generated 
from this mode of production, in tandem with domestic social forces, become internalised into 
geographically specific state forms. Stated more concretely, passive revolution puts class struggle and 
preoccupations with societal transformation (indeed revolution) back onto the political agenda. Such a 
focus on revolution was integral to the original formation of U&CD by Leon Trotsky (as will be 
discussed later), but has been largely absent from the concern of scholars associated with the latest 
wave of scholarship on the topic. Thus, whereas current trends in U&CD can collapse into a detached 
structural commentary via the positing of trans-historical laws (from which there can appear little 
escape), passive revolution breaks with this. It does so by offering more modest claims, namely to 
explore the specific expression of U&CD within the capitalist epoch. Through the definite 
geographical seats by which the concept is rendered and operationalised, passive revolution focuses 
much greater attention on actual processes of class struggle and state formation, grounding the places 
and spaces of revolutions sociologically.6 This obviously does include the stratagems of ruling classes 
that disaggregate and domesticate subaltern class struggles. However, this is analysed to the extent 
that intellectual efforts can be used to inform a philosophy of praxis that is anti-passive revolutionary 
                                                          
4 Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New 
Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, 24:1 (1998), pp. 3-21; Julian Saurin ‘The Formation of Neo-
Gramscians in International Relations and International Political Economy: Neither Gramsci nor Marx’ in 
Alison J Ayers, (ed) Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory: Modern Princes and 
Naked Emperors (New York: Palgrave, 2008). 
5 Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, 12:2 (1983), pp.162-175; Ives and Short (2013); Adam D. Morton, ‘: State Formation, 
Passive Revolution and the international’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35:3 (2007), pp. 597-
621. 
 
6 Adam D Morton, ‘The Continuum of Passive Revolution’, Capital & Class, 34: 3 (2010), p321. 
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in its orientation. Ultimately this needs to be done by moving debates away from a narrow circle of 
professional intellectuals to become an element of culture.7  
 
It has already been recognised that U&CD provides a bridge to wider social theory, including 
Gramscian thought.8 More decisively, Michael Burawoy once suggestively stated that ‘Where 
Trotsky’s horizons stop, Gramsci’s begin’.9 Building on this statement, it will be argued that the two 
thinkers’ key ideas (uneven and combined development for Trotsky and passive revolution for 
Gramsci) demonstrate a complementarity with one another, that, when taken together, are integral to 
explaining the core features of international relations under capitalism.10 Used in tandem they can 
provide a powerful statement for historical materialism’s foundational contribution to the discipline of 
International Relations.  
 
Before proceeding it is important to clarify some important meanings at this stage. To be clear, in 
claiming that passive revolution is a universal concept I am decidedly not saying that it is trans-
historical in nature (as is the claim by some scholars regarding U&CD). As will be explained in more 
detail later, passive revolution is only capable of referring to the capitalist era. Rather, in invoking the 
term ‘universal’ I am implying that the term is equally applicable throughout the world. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the phrase employed in this article ‘capitalist modernity’ is not without 
controversy. Ellen Meiksins Wood for example, has forcefully argued for these two terms not to be 
conflated as their meanings are not identical.11 However, whilst one may not necessarily disagree with 
such a proposition, the claim here, following Burns, is that whilst the two terms are not historically 
                                                          
7 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol.2 (ed. Joseph Buttigieg) (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011b), p233, Q4§60. One such effort to make the concept become a part of popular culture has come from 
Enrique Semo, interviewed in Mexican national newspaper La Jornada, see Ericka Montaña Garfias, ‘México 
vive una una revolución pasiva, asegura Enrique Semo’, La Jornada (23 November 2014).   
8 John Hobson, ‘What is at Stake in the Neo-Trostkyist Debate? Towards a Non-Eurocentric Historical 
Sociology of Uneven and Combined Development’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 40:1 (2011), 
p.141. 
9 Michael Burawoy, ‘Two methods in search of science’ Theory and Society, 18: 6 (1989), p. 793. I am indebted 
to Adam D Morton for drawing my attention to this quote. 
10 See also, Adam D Morton, Revolution and the State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven 
Development (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), p.4 
11 Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Modernity, postmodernity or capitalism?’ Review of International Political Economy, 
4:3 (2007), pp.539-560. 
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necessary to one another, they have been contingently related in reality and this requires 
explanation.12 Passive revolution therefore offers a theory of modernity that illuminates why 
capitalism has remained hegemonic in this epoch.13 
 
Prior to embarking on this intellectual endeavour, it should be noted that a host of preliminary 
objections need to be overcome. These objections link to 1) the suitability of having ‘universal’ 
concepts, 2) the related issue of whether the construction of universal arguments leads to a 
Eurocentric diffusionist viewpoint that denies other people(s) and places their own agency in the 
making of history, and, 3) there is the objection that such an argument leads to the problem of 
‘concept stretching’. Let us deal with each objection in turn.   
 
Regarding the issue of universal concepts, such a notion has clearly experienced sustained attack from 
postmodernism. Reduced to its most basic propositions, postmodernism claims that no singular 
historical narrative exists and that furthermore, there is always a diversity of meaning and identities 
which problematise any easy comparison between traditional categories in the social sciences.14 This 
epistemology has gained wider purchase in IR through the distinct, but related body of thought, 
postcolonialism.15 This article is, by contrast, unashamedly trying to construct a meta-narrative of 
modernity, and indeed would make the case that the haste to discard any grand narrative is in fact 
misguided. Here the incredulity expressed by postmodernism towards grand theory can easily slip into 
myopia by its failure to see interconnections and the unfolding of distinct logics at work.16 In defence 
of such a proposition, two key arguments can be marshalled. First, general abstractions are in fact 
                                                          
12 Tony Burns, ‘Capitalism, modernity and the nation state: A critique of Hannes Lacher’, Capital & Class, 34: 
2, pp. 246, 250. 
13 Peter Thomas, The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (London: Brill, 2009), pp.155-
7. 
14 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, p.38; Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
15 Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity. 2009), p.6; Kamran Matin, 
‘Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 19:2 (2013), pp. 353-377. 
16 Ferderic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural logic of Late Capitalism (London: Duke University 
Press). Drawing from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lyotard, 1984, invoked language games to demonstrate how 
different social situations acquire their own rules and intelligibility that are not transferable to other situations. 
However, this is to ignore the fact that we still require the over-arching knowledge of what a language game is 
to understand such micro-situations.  
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necessary to be able to make any kind of meaningful comparative historical analysis. It is possible, 
therefore, to think of key elements of the social world that, whilst differing in time and space, still 
fundamentally constitute social reality.17 The issue at stake here is how one thinks of such categories 
of identity. As Rosenberg explains with regards to Trotsky’s philosophical premises on this matter: 
Trotsky points out that no two cone bearings in a production batch will ever be exactly 
identical; but so long as their variation remains within a given margin of ‘tolerance’, they may 
safely be treated as if they were so. And something similar, he suggests, applies to concepts: 
they too have a margin of tolerance, within which their non-correspondence to their objects 
can in practice be disregarded.18 
 
Second, I do not discount the importance of localised experience and specificity that numerous 
postmodern and post-structuralist scholars have sought to draw our attention to.19 Rather, the article 
highlights how particularity remains within a universal framework. This is the reason why seemingly 
discrepant phenomenon such as Keynesianism and Fascism can both be interpreted within the broader 
logic of passive revolution, (as will be further detailed later). In each case the form is the same but the 
local content (the geographical seats) differ. Thus, as Gramsci declared, ‘Finding the real identity 
underneath the apparent differentiation and contradiction and finding the substantial diversity 
underneath the apparent identity is the most essential quality of the critic of ideas and of the historian 
of social development.’20 
 
The meaning implied by the term ‘universal’ clearly does matter however, which links closely with 
the potential objection of Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism is defined by the belief in the primacy of 
European development that is sui generis. Such a view downplays or ignores wider interconnections 
(including those of slavery and imperialism), whilst holding the European pattern of development as 
                                                          
17 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy in the mirror of uneven and combined 
development’, International Politics, 50:2 (2013a), p.194. 
18 Justin Rosenberg, ‘The philosophical premises of uneven and combined development’, Review of 
International Studies, 39:03 (2013b), p.575. 
19 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition; Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other 
writing 1972-77, edited by Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). 
20 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol.1 ed. Joseph Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011), p. 128-9, Q1§43. 
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the superior standard to which other countries must inevitably aspire and be measured by.21 A 
potential danger in the argument constructed here could be that the notion of passive revolution 
succumbs to a diffusionist reading of history that sees European capitalism transforming the world 
(unproblematically) in its own image, with social forces in other regions and states lacking any 
agency in this process.22 Such an understanding, however, would be insufficiently dialectical on two 
separate counts. First, there is no need to assume that any form of development, including that of 
capitalism, takes place in national isolation.23 Indeed, this was contrary to Gramsci’s formulation of 
the concept of passive revolution as will be detailed below. In this sense, passive revolution can be 
read as a method of incorporated comparison as it seeks to show the interconnections between social 
phenomena across time and space.24 The method of incorporated comparison takes neither the whole 
(world system), nor its constituent parts (regions, countries etc) as fixed units of analysis. Instead, this 
method is attentive to the dialectic relation between them, and does not claim either as the prime locus 
of explanation. In McMichael’s words, the incorporated comparative method ‘progressively 
constructs the whole as a methodological procedure by giving context to historical phenomenon.’25 
The stress is on the cumulative process of history. Comparison therefore, ‘is ‘internal’ to historical 
inquiry, whereby process instances are comparable because they are historically connected and 
mutually conditioning’.26 This approach has the advantage of allowing us to appreciate the totality of 
capitalist relations (and the geopolitical pressures that it thereby generates) whilst being attentive to its 
different articulations at various spatial scales.  Second, a diffusionist reading should be rejected 
owing to the stress that Gramsci put on the inevitability of resistance to the process of passive 
                                                          
21 Matin, ‘Redeeming the universal’, p.354; Robbie Shilliam, ‘The Atlantic as a vector of uneven and combined 
development’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:1 (2009, pp. 69-88; Cemal Burak Tansel, 
‘Deafening silence? Marxism, international historical sociology and the spectre of Eurocentrism’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 21:1 (2015), p.78. 
22 Adam D Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy, 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 49-50. 
23John Hobson, The Eastern origins of Western civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
24 Phillip McMichael, ‘Incorporating comparison within a world-historical perspective: An alternative 
comparative method’, American Sociological Review, 55:3 (1990), pp.385-397; Morton, ‘Waiting for Gramsci’, 
p.618 
25 Ibid p.386. 
26 Phillip McMichael, ‘World-Systems Analysis, Globalization and Incorporated Comparison', Journal of World 
Systems Research, 3 (2000), p.671. This partially serves as an answer to Hobson’s, 2011, question about what is 
added in discussions of the international in these new debates that cannot be provided by previous World 
System’s analysis (as the latter do indeed take countries and regions as fixed units of analysis as well as the 
world system itself). 
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revolution.  This rejects any simple notion of unproblematic and unilinear development. Rather than a 
one-way transmission of power and ideas, it is better to think of passive revolution as emanating from 
what Gramsci referred to as centres ‘of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination.’27 
 
Kamran Matin has usefully pointed out the contradiction between theory and method in postcolonial 
thought.  On the one hand, it rejects the universalism or macro-historical explanation that is associated 
with Eurocentrism, yet on the other hand it relies on a method of understanding colonial societies as 
being forged through their inter-societal constitution.  However, he argues that, 
A unified theoretical comprehension of the social and the international must…be central to 
any attempt at supplanting Eurocentrism. This requires an explicit theoretical incorporation of 
the universal. But a conception of the universal that is fundamentally rethought away from 
being an immanent self-transcendence of the particular.28 
 
Passive revolution I believe is capable of such a form of universalism that maintains a focus on the 
cumulative process of shared history, but retains a focus on national particularity. To sum up, quoting 
from Gramsci, ‘the premise of an “organic diffusion from a homogenous centre and a homogenous 
way of thinking and acting” is not sufficient. The same ray of light passes through different prisms 
and yields different refractions of light.’29 
  
The final objection relates to the issue of concept stretching. This refers to the wider usage of a term 
beyond which it was originally intended, so as to rob it of its meaning and explanatory power. Such a 
scepticism towards the wider usage of passive revolution has been raised by Alex Callinicos who is 
wary of the concept ‘just becoming another way of referring to the dynamism and flexibility of 
capitalism.’30 Just as Neil Smith criticised the indiscriminate use of the term ‘uneven development’, 
there is the danger that passive revolution comes to explain everything, and therefore nothing.31 I 
                                                          
27 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 192, Q1§30. 
28 Matin, ‘Redeeming the universal’ p.355 
29 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol.1, p.128, Q1§43 
30 Alex Callinicos, The Limits of Passive Revolution. Capital and Class, 34:3 (2010), p. 505. 
31 Neil Smith, ‘The Geography of Uneven Development’ in Bill Dunn and Hugo Radice (eds) 100 Years of 
Permanent Revolution (London: Pluto, 2006), p.182. 
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contend, however, that this criticism can quite easily be overcome. Of course, the term passive 
revolution is trying to tell us something fundamental – and thus generalisable - about capitalism and 
international relations. However, it also points us towards a political strategy, namely the critique of 
the state and the need to move beyond this form of organising social relations. As Anne Showstack 
Sassoon argues with regards to this, passive revolution functions on two different levels, ‘as a 
discussion of some historical events and as an expression of a theoretical problem.’32 It is thus an 
inherently engaged and politicised concept that calls for reflection and alternatives as opposed to a 
detached form of academic commentary which some forms of U&CD analysis fall into.  
 
 
With these potential objections overcome, the argument for understanding passive revolution as a 
universal concept with geographical seats will now be made in the following manner. First, I will set 
out the main claims and achievements of IR scholars associated with the concept of U&CD, before 
exploring some of the key criticisms that have been levelled against this school of thought. These 
include its ability to say something specific about capitalism, its shift away from being a concept 
designed to evaluate revolutionary possibilities and its aspatial nature. Second, I will outline the scope 
of passive revolution and, drawing examples from Gramsci and beyond, make the case for its 
universal applicability and various geographical seats. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of what 
passive revolution brings to such extant debates, demonstrating how the criticisms of U&CD can be 
overcome when deployed in tandem with passive revolution. Taken together as mutually reinforcing 
concepts they demonstrate a powerful contribution that historical materialism can make to the 
discipline of International Relations. 
 
  
                                                          
32 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p.205. 
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The contribution of uneven and combined development 
 
Over the last decade or so, U&CD has contributed to a major new research agenda, pioneering a third 
wave of scholarship within the Historical Sociology of International Relations.33 Drawing from Leon 
Trotsky’s original development of the concept, Justin Rosenberg has sought to further advance the 
term by claiming that U&CD offers not just a universal, but furthermore, a trans-historical concept of 
what development actually is.34 Whilst scholars have operationalised the term in different ways, the 
array of literature on this topic is a testament to its powerful explanatory power on a diverse range of 
issues, including inter alia the state-system and geopolitics,35 the origins of the First World War,36 
state-formation37 and the possibilities of resistance in a transnational age.38 
 
What then are its principle achievements? First, U&CD offers a major statement about the causal 
importance of the ‘international’ in human history and development.39 In this explanation, the 
international, ‘is marked by an inherent dynamism as more developed societies interact with less 
developed ones, causing combined development in backward societies, which reinforce rather than 
                                                          
33 Hobson, ‘What is at Stake’. 
34 Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects (London: New Park, 1962); Leon 
Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 1985; Justin Rosenberg ‘Why is there no 
international historical sociology?’, European Journal of International Relations, 12:3 (2006), pp.307-340; 
Justin Rosenberg, ‘Basic problems in the theory of uneven and combined development: Part II unevenness and 
political multiplicity’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs  23:1 (2010), pp.165–189; Rosenberg, 
‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’; Rosenberg, ‘Philosophical premises’. 
35 Alex Callinicos,  ‘Does capitalism need the state system?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4 
(2007), pp. 533-549; Ray Kiely ‘Spatial hierarchy and/or contemporary geopolitics: what can and can't uneven 
and combined development explain?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25:2 (2013), pp.231-248; 
Hannes Lacher, Beyond Globalization: capitalism, territoriality and the international relations of modernity 
(London: Routledge, 2006); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern 
International Relations (London: Verso, 2003). 
36 Alexander Anievas, ‘1914 in world historical perspective: The ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ origins of World 
War I’, European Journal of International Relations, 19:4 (2013), pp.721-746; Jeremy Green, ‘Uneven and 
combined development and the Anglo-German prelude to World War I’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 18:2 (2012), pp.345-368; Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’. 
37 Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for the State in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances in the Middle East 
(London: IB Tauris, 2015); Kamran Matin, ‘Uneven and combined development in world history: the 
international relations of state-formation in premodern Iran’, European Journal of International Relations, 13:3 
(2007), pp. 419-447; Adam D Morton, ‘Reflections on Uneven Development Mexican Revolution, Primitive 
Accumulation, Passive Revolution’, Latin American Perspectives, 37:1 (2010), pp.7-34. 
38 Andreas Bieler, ‘The EU, global Europe and processes of uneven and combined development: the problem of 
transnational labour solidarity’, Review of International Studies, 39: 1 (2013), pp.161-183. 
39 Rosenberg, ‘Basic problems’. International is defined here as the as the ‘dimension of social reality which 
arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society’, Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no 
international historical sociology?’ p. 308. 
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straighten out, the unevenness of world-historical development’.40 In contrast to the unilinear 
conception of development offered by modernization theory, U&CD offers a multilinear and 
interactive framework whereby world history is presented as an ontological whole, therefore 
collapsing the false distinction between international and domestic society, and instead looking at the 
sociological constitution of difference.41 On this basis it becomes impossible to analyse a singular 
society without reference to its entanglement with others. This rules out methodological nationalism, 
and highlights how the so-called billiard ball imagery of societies – fully formed entities knocking 
into one another – can be rendered false.42  
 
Second, U&CD adds a greater dimension of sociological analysis to IR. It does so by providing a 
social theory of the ‘international’ which (it is alleged) has been neglected by hitherto existing 
theories, including those of a critical persuasion.43 Therefore, the concept is claimed to offer ‘a much 
needed alternative conception of the historical process’.44 In such a manner, U&CD offers a profound 
challenge to the dominance of Realism and its ontological primacy of anarchy. It does so by de-
reifying this concept and instead demonstrating how it is an emergent property of uneven and 
combined development. In the place of anarchy as a foundational (yet unexplained) premise of 
international relations, it is argued that the conditioning situation of uneven and combined 
development serves to socialise state’s behaviour.45  
 
However, just as the concept has generated key research avenues it has also provoked intense debate.  
Some have argued that U&CD scholars - most notably Justin Rosenberg - are themselves remiss in 
failing to explain the foundational premises of U&CD – namely what the primary causes of uneven 
                                                          
40 Benno Teschke, ‘Advances and impasses in Fred Halliday's international historical sociology: a critical 
appraisal’, International Affairs, 87:5(2011), pp.1087-1106. 
41 Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no international historical sociology?’ p. 327. 
42 Rosenberg, ‘Philosophical premises’, p.570; Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (London: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
43 Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’, p.184; Rosenberg, ‘Philosophical premises’, p. 570. 
44 Alex Callinicos and Justin Rosenberg, ‘Uneven and combined development: the social-relational substratum 
of ‘the international’? An exchange of letters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:1 (2008), p. 85 
45 Hobson, ‘What is at Stake’; Rosenberg (2010); Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’. 
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and combined development actually are, and how this changes during different epochs.46 Following a 
similar line of argument, Alex Callinicos, has stated that we need to retain an analysis based upon 
historically-specific modes of production if we are to cash-in the general abstraction that is uneven 
and combined development.47 This links to a much broader debate, namely the historical applicability 
of the term. For some, it is a concept that is only rendered meaningful within capitalist society and its 
particular dynamics.48 For others it has a more generalizable, indeed trans-historical validity.49 In 
many ways the disagreement in these debates link to the differing starting points of the respective 
authors. That is to say, they offer different explanations (explanans) owing to different explanandum 
(the phenomenon to be explained). For critics of the trans-historical position, it is claimed that this 
method of operationalising U&CD risks turning a triviality or truism (that nothing develops evenly) 
into an historical law. It thereby transforms an axiom and a theorem into a theory.50  As Rioux has 
argued trenchantly regarding Rosenberg’s propositions, ‘his conceptualisation of U&CD as a timeless 
structure of human development directly informs the poverty of his approach and its failure to move 
beyond descriptive generalisations.’51 However, the prime motivation of Rosenberg’s intellectual 
inquiry is to contribute to a historical materialist theorising of the ‘international’, specifically as the 
‘visualising and mapping of the international as a dimension of social causality.’52 His main 
explanandum therefore does not begin from a set of questions that seek to only understand the present 
conjuncture (e.g. whether multiplicity is or is not being transcended).53 Rather, it is the more abstract 
question of why we have multiplicity in the first place. In Rosenberg’s words, therefore:  
                                                          
46 Kiely, ‘Spatial hierarchy’, p.237; Sébastien Rioux, ‘Mind the (Theoretical) gap: On the poverty of 
international relations theorising of uneven and combined development’, Global Society, 29:4 (2015), p.485.  
47 Callinicos and Rosenberg, ‘Uneven and combined development’, pp.82-3. 
48 Sam Ashman, ‘Capitalism, uneven and combined development and the transhistoric, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 29-46; Jamie Allinson and Alexander Anievas, ‘The uses and misuses of 
uneven and combined development: an anatomy of a concept’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:1 
(2009), pp.47-67; Neil Davidson, ‘Putting the nation back into ‘the international’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 9-28. 
49 Hobson, ‘What is at Stake’; Matin ‘Redeeming the Universal’; Rosenberg, ‘Basic Problems’, Rosenberg, 
‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’; Rosenberg ‘Philosophical premises’. 
50 Kees van der Pijl, ‘The Uneven and Combined Development of International Historical Sociology’ in Radika 
Desai (ed), Theoretical Engagements in Geopolitical Economy Vol30a (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2015), pp. 60 
51 Rioux, ‘Mind the (Theoretical) gap’, p499. 
52 Rosenberg, ‘Philosophical premises’, p586. 
53 Van der Pijl, ‘Uneven and Combined Development’, p.47 takes issue with this mode of inquiry and claims 
that ‘A Marxist critique must always relate to the present.’ 
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the point about ‘unevenness’ is not in the first instance that it posits inequalities and 
differences among coexisting societies; it is rather that, posited of social development, it 
makes sense of the existence of a plurality of societies in the first place—and with that, of the 
extension of a lateral field of interaction which is both intrinsic to and behaviourally distinct 
within the expanded conception of social development now posited.54 
 
The concept is therefore mobilised for different modes of explanation, but the question arises whether 
such a conception is still able to usefully tell us about contemporary capitalism? It would seem that 
the more stock that is invested in making U&CD a stronger general abstraction with trans-historical 
validity, the less it functions as a precise tool for analysing the specificity of capitalism (and how 
U&CD develops under this mode of production). As Neil Smith put it, ‘the potentially penetrating 
insights of the theory are dissolved when uneven development is seen as a universal metaphysics, its 
meaning reduced to the lowest common denominator.’55 This is a lacuna that I believe passive 
revolution can fill and provides the case for why, to understand capitalist modernity, the two concepts 
must be used in tandem.  Drawing from the work of Jairus Banaji we can say that conjoining the two 
concepts allows U&CD to be transformed from a ‘simple category’ - a term common to multiple 
epochs - to a ‘historically determinate category’, or so called ‘concrete category’, integral to 
understanding a particular epoch.56 Passive revolution therefore gives the concept of U&CD a greater 
degree of analytical clarity to understand the specificity of capitalist modernity. 
 
What can more plausibly be asserted as a form of critique (and flows from the above argument), is 
that the social purpose of this mode of trans-historical inquiry does differ from that which the concept 
was originally intended. Ian Bruff has noted that the current literature on U&CD is most comfortable 
when intellectual efforts are devoted to the study of pre-contemporary history (which marks its 
substantive field of research).57 This usage, whilst contributing to academic debates clearly does move 
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the concept away from Trotsky’s original intention, namely to think about the possibilities for 
revolution.58 While Rosenberg believes this strengthens an historical materialist analysis of 
international relations, critics have argued that this has led to a shift from activism to academia that 
denudes a Marxist analysis of its core concepts of class formation and struggle.59 Contrariwise, it will 
be demonstrated below that such notions are intrinsic to the notion of passive revolution.  
 
Finally, despite the fact that spatio-temporal claims are integral to the concept of U&CD,60 much of 
the prominent literature fails to engage with the vast amount of geographical scholarship that has been 
produced on uneven development and instead narrowly focuses on a few scattered phrases of 
Trotsky.61 Space becomes an unexplored premise, a mere happenstance of developmental unevenness 
and combination.62 As a result, there is inadequate consideration of spatial questions and little spatial 
analysis of U&CD in operation, for example, the spatial reorganization of state power, or what 
Brenner refers to as state spatialisation strategies and the contradictions that flow from this.63 This 
lack of a spatial analysis is a major limitation of U&CD, if we take heed of Henri Lefebvre’s 
observation that ‘the social relations of production have an existence to the extent they have a spatial 
existence; they project themselves into a space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process 
producing that space itself.’64 The reorganisation of social relations implied by the term ‘combination’ 
must necessarily translate into a reorganisation of space. However, as noted, this is insufficiently 
explored through the extant literature on U&CD. As Rosenberg himself has stated of U&CD ‘it lacks 
any tools for specifying the causal properties of those processes of social life to whose multiplicity 
and interaction it draws attention.’ Consequently, ‘it cannot operate as a replacement for the classical 
social theories whose limitations we are trying to overcome’ and without these ‘it cannot reach down 
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to the level of concrete historical explanation at all.’65 Once again, when thought about in conjunction 




The concept of passive revolution was developed by Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks.66 It is 
intrinsically linked to the institutionalisation or expansion of capitalism (hence there is no possibility 
of its trans-historical extension).67 A passive revolution, or a ‘revolution’ without a “revolution”’ 
occurs when social relations are fundamentally reorganised (revolution) but ultimately, popular 
initiatives are neutralised so as to continue class domination (restoration).68 It therefore involves a 
combination of change and conservatism. ‘The problem’, argues Gramsci, ‘is to see whether in this 
dialectic ‘revolution/restoration whether it is revolution or restoration that predominates.’69 As Peter 
Thomas has pointed out, the concept of passive revolution was developed in multiple stages or ‘cuts’ 
within the Prison Notebooks as Gramsci began to appreciate the wider purchase that the term could 
have.70 Drawing from, but modifying Vincenzo Cuoco’s initial use of the term, Gramsci first 
deployed passive revolution to refer to the role of the Piedmont state during the Italian Risorgimento 
and the limited form of hegemony that emerged from this.  Key here is the role of the state in 
displacing social groups in leading a process of renewal.71 The term ‘passive’ was employed here to 
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denote the difference between a national-popular movement from below, or what Gramsci calls ‘a 
political revolution of a radical-Jacobin type’ that overthrew the old feudal classes in France versus a 
revolution from above or ‘royal conquest’ that found accommodation with them in the case of Italy.72 
Thus, rather than confronting and displacing the old feudal classes as occurred in France, the 
Risorgimento resulted in a compromised bourgeois transition. In Gramsci’s words, 
Restoration becomes the first policy whereby social struggles find sufficiently elastic 
frameworks to allow the bourgeoisie to gain power without dramatic upheavals, without the 
French machinery of terror. The old feudal classes are demoted from their dominant position 
to a ‘governing’ one, but are not eliminated, nor is there any attempt to liquidate them as an 
organic whole; instead of a class they become a ‘caste’ with specific cultural and 
psychological characteristics but no longer with predominant economic functions.73 
 
Two wider issues require dwelling upon here. First, the Italian Risorgimento, theorised as a passive 
revolution, was clearly placed within the broader international context of uneven and combined 
development. As Gramsci states, ‘It is also necessary to bear in mind that international relations 
become intertwined with those internal relations of a nation-state, and this, in turn, creates peculiar 
and historically concrete combinations.’74 Capitalism was instituted therefore as a means of mimesis 
and (attempted) developmental catch up.75 To cite Gramsci once more, ‘It was not so much a question 
of freeing the advanced economic forces from antiquated legal and political fetters but rather of 
creating the general conditions that would enable these economic forces to come into existence and 
grow on the model of other countries.’76 Wider international factors were highlighted as vital to this, 
including foreign domination of the Italian peninsula, and in turn the influence of the French 
Revolution, not only in helping to ignite ideas of nationalism but later, with the sapping effect of the 
Napoleonic wars leading to a weakening of militant energy.77 However, international factors, 
although influential, were not seen as determinant with regards to the Risorgimento’s outcome. 
Instead, the national peculiarities of Italy were also stressed as key factors in forging the socio-
political consequences. Of particular note was the lack of major capital development in Italy, and, 
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unlike the French situation, no organic link between urban and rural areas. Instead, there remained an 
important divide between the urban North and the rural South that, far from being overcome, was in 
fact perpetuated with unification, with a parasitic industrial North exploiting the agrarian South.78 
Gramsci concluded that the revolutionary leaders in Italy were ‘aiming at the creation of a modern 
state but in fact produced a bastard.’79 This was owing to the new state’s limited hegemonic base, 
founded as it was on a compromise between the old aristocracy and the emerging industrialists. 
Lacking national-popular appeal, these classes only achieved a weak hegemony over the rest of 
society and therefore had a poor capacity to economically transform the country.80 We can witness 
here how the concept itself (as with all of Gramsci’s concepts), was developed through historical and 
geographical specificity.81 To return to Halliday’s key points about what the study of revolution 
should entail in IR, we can see that passive revolution is clearly able to locate the place of revolutions 
and discuss their importance for the international system more broadly. We can also conclude from 
the above example that ‘the notion of passive revolution is able to encapsulate specific processes 
within the general circumstances of uneven and combined development.’82 It therefore covers 
Halliday’s second criteria by exploring the international dimensions of any revolution. Moreover, in 
being able to move through varying spatial scales (down to the level of the subnational in the 
discussion of the role of Piedmont), it is precisely able to reach down to the level of concrete 
historical explanation that Rosenberg has admitted U&CD cannot do. What then of Halliday’s third 
category of theoretical reflection? 
 
Gramsci quickly came to realise that the term had far greater purchase as an analytical category 
beyond the scope of Italian history. The second usage of passive revolution then came from processes 
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of state formation in Europe that had undergone a similar process to Italy, namely in trying to achieve 
developmental catch up and thereby transforming social relations, but without significant input from 
below. Rather these were ‘revolutions from above’ that sought to remake society.83 Bismark’s 
Germany would be a classic example of this,84 but, as will be discussed in the next section, European 
development in general post-French Revolution was seen as the history of passive revolution.85 As 
Bruff surveys, the concept of passive revolution was, from its genesis, expansionary in nature, linked 
to the need to situate Italian development in the broader international context and second to analyse 
the contemporaneous transformations in other European societies.86 It is the latter that then provide 
the basis for thinking about the diverse geographical seats. 
 
Finally, in his discussion of Americanism and Fordism, Gramsci discusses how passive revolution can 
be used as a broader category of analysis and interpretation.87 Here it refers to a generalised means of 
statecraft in the expansion of capitalism but with pacifying reforms (which are themselves a response 
to subaltern class pressures). As Peter Thomas has argued, in this final usage, passive revolution 
refers less to a specific event but rather to a more generalised process or logic of modernisation.88  In 
sum, therefore, passive revolution is about the reorganisation and restoration of class power. This 
involves a process of transformism whereby there is ‘the formation of an ever more extensive ruling 
class within an already established framework.’89 It includes elements of both revolution (in 
transforming the social relations of production) and restoration (maintenance/ continuity of power 
structures without significant subaltern empowerment). Finally, its central feature is statisation, with 
the state replacing social groups in leading the process of renewal.90 In all the instances in which it is 
invoked, passive revolutionary forms of state formation are tied to key events that serve as punctual 
moments of history.  
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What then is the case for thinking about its universal applicability? Gramsci himself noted that, ‘since 
similar situations almost always arise in every historical development, one should see if it is not 
possible to draw from this some general principle of political science and art.’91 He also queried in his 
day whether passive revolution would have an enduring relevance, asking ‘Does the conception of the 
"passive revolution” have a "present" significance? Are we in a period of "restoration revolution” to 
be permanently consolidated, to be organised ideologically, to be exalted lyrically?’.92 As Adam 
Morton has previously elucidated, to explore this issue requires that we do not simply apply 
Gramsci’s concepts  mechanically to other historical eras and places, but rather we are required to 
think in a Gramscian way, asking, most importantly, whether ‘theory can advance a practical 
understanding of a concrete reality or situation that is different from that in which it originated’.93 
However, in this effort to find commonality and interpretative resonance we must be fully aware of 
the dangers of the not letting over-generalised claims lose their critical purchase.94 It is here that I 
believe the strict geographical rendering of passive revolution becomes relevant and this will be 
returned to towards the end of the following section and in the concluding discussion. 
 
The case for passive revolution’s universal applicability 
 
Stefan Kipfer has noted that Gramsci was ‘particularly interested in conjunctures: historical moments 
that articulate the punctual temporality of the event with longer-term forms of historical duration.’95 
This is especially important when analysing how Gramsci came to develop the term passive 
revolution, from the Italian Risorgimento onwards. The key punctual moment for Gramsci was the 
experience of the French Revolution (1789-1799) and its aftermath.  This not only made the Italian 
Risorgimento comparable in terms of the distinct lack of a national-popular hegemonic project 
articulated in Italy as compared to France, but also allowed Gramsci to see the history of nineteenth-
century Europe as a series of passive revolutions, or what he saw as reforms from above (owing to the 
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cumulative process of history). This was achieved by ‘successive waves of small reform rather than 
revolutionary explosions’ (which nevertheless took on local characteristics), and were designed 
precisely to offset the more dramatic upheavals of the French case.96 Here the conditioning situation 
of uneven and combined development was clearly noted. The example of revolutionary 
transformation could not be contained within isolated borders and stimulated a class-based reaction to 
it from other European countries which in turn fostered the Napoleonic Wars.97 However, a longer-
term pattern of nationalism and reformism were to be the geographically specific reactions to this 
event, internalised within state forms so as to modernise on the continued premise of class 
domination.  
 
Beginning in the 1930s but consolidating further with the end of the Second World War (beyond the 
lifetime therefore of Gramsci who died in 1937), Americanism and Fordism was identified as another 
era that ushered in a new wave of passive revolution.  Lurking here was of course the threat of 
communism and the Bolshevik example, propelling governments to take reformist steps to absorb 
working class radicalism through limited means of wealth redistribution.98 The Russian Revolution of 
1917 therefore served as another key punctual moment of history. For most of the Western World, 
this new epoch of passive revolution was experienced as a relatively progressive, albeit contradictory, 
form development (exemplified by Keynesianism). This served to statise discontent, expanding 
capitalism whilst offering real but limited concessions to the subaltern classes. It thereby displaced 
more radical demands whilst not offering meaningful political inclusion or economic justice (key 
hallmarks of passive revolution). It should be noted that Gramsci’s analysis of Fordism was prescient, 
arguing that the benefits of high wages were likely to be transitory and could only be secured so far as 
they corresponded to the early monopoly phase of capitalism.99 He (correctly) predicted that they 
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would soon be eroded via competition, which of course was to be a contributing factor to Fordism’s 
eventual demise and replacement with a neoliberal model, itself a further punctual moment in history.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that fascism in Italy was viewed by Gramsci as an alternative trajectory of 
passive revolution based on the same logic; namely, a defensive ruling class stratagem of 
developmental catch up that sought to augment their own dominant position whilst transforming 
social relations in line with the competitive pressures emanating from the international political 
economy.  Fascism was therefore interpreted by Gramsci as being analogous (and connected) to the 
moderate and conservative regimes of the previous century in the sense of seeking to preserve the 
political and economic position of the old feudal classes by avoiding major agrarian reform.100 
Moreover, Italian Fascism was interpreted as a form of revolution from above that, whilst changing 
productive relations, did not offer significant empowerment for the subaltern classes. As Gramsci 
clarifies,  
relatively far-reaching modification are being introduced into the country’s economic 
structure in order to accentuate the ‘plan of production’ element; in other words, that 
socialisation and co-operation in the sphere of production are being increased, without 
however touching (or at least not going beyond the regulation and control of) individual and 
group appropriation of profit.101 
 
This was linked to the need of Italy to compete with more advanced nations who not only had larger 
stores of raw materials resulting from their colonial possessions, but also had higher levels of capital 
owing to their earlier transitions from feudalism.  
 
Beyond the specific cases provided by Gramsci, there are further examples that can be utilised to 
build the case for the universal experience of passive revolution (moving away from simply a 
phenomenon concerned with the West). An important category to include here is the wave of 
nationalist movements that occurred in the wake of decolonisation after 1945. These took place 
beyond the lifetime of Gramsci, but it is nevertheless revealing that he refers to Gandhi as having a 
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naïve theoristisation of passive revolution.102 Partha Chatterjee has gone so far as to claim that 
‘passive revolution is the general form of the transition from colonial to the post-colonial national-
states of the 20th century’, whilst Morton has described passive revolution as a hallmark of 
postcolonial capitalism.103  In his specific analysis of India, Chatterjee refers to the nationalist 
movement as moving through three phases. First, there is the ‘moment of departure’ where struggle 
and rebellion open space for a new political project. This emphasises the strength of Western material 
conditions and progress but nevertheless claims a superior Eastern cultural quality. Second, there is 
the ‘moment of manoeuvre’. This involves the emergence of new elites in national alliance who seek 
to mobilise subaltern classes in an anti-colonial struggle, yet sustain the belief that only educated 
elites can provide the necessary cultural synthesis of East and West needed for developmental catch 
up. Subaltern elements are therefore distanced from the structures of the state. Finally, there is the 
‘moment of arrival’ leading to exclusion, repression and the marginalisation of subaltern elements. 
Radical rupture becomes de-emphasised as a discourse of order is established.104 Such an analysis has 
been utilised elsewhere to explain further forms of peripheral state formation.105 The import here is to 
not only recognise the structural conditioning of the international system (as per U&CD) but to then 
focus our attention on the precise modalities of class forces constructing a national project. As Morton 
has argued, this enables us to construct an ‘interpretive method in historical sociology focusing on 
inter-related instances of state transition within world-historical processes, where the particulars of 
state formation are realised within the general features of capitalist modernity’.106 To phase this 
another way, the universal pressures generated from capitalist geopolitical competition are 
acknowledged but the geographical seats of class articulation remain the priority for analysis. 
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A final example to be invoked in order to demonstrate the universal applicability of passive revolution 
is the case of Latin American state formation in the twentieth century.107 Robert Cox has noted that 
passive revolution and the associated notion of transformism are especially apposite concepts for 
developing regions.108 Although this has already been established to a degree with regards to post-
colonial societies in general, it is worth exploring the Latin American case specifically as formal 
independence in the continent had been achieved much earlier here, yet patterns of neo-colonial 
domination remained crucial influences.109 It has been widely recognised that Latin American state 
formation in the twentieth century was one that was clearly marked by the structural condition of 
‘delayed dependent development’.110 Resulting from this was the need to engage in developmental 
catch up so as to avoid stagnation or subordination. This was most clearly manifested, first through 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and the associated populist political project, and secondarily 
with the turn to authoritarianism (which itself emerged from the contradictions of the previous 
strategy).  
 
The international context of uneven and combined development was clearly vital for fostering the turn 
to ISI in Latin America in terms of the Great Depression and World War II. This cut the region off 
from previous markets and forced the continent, by necessity, towards greater internal production of 
goods. Furthermore, the changing character of hegemony at the international level from the Pax 
Britanica to the Pax Americana was also important (providing a changing centre of irradiation). 
Linked to previous discussions, American hegemony after World War II would presage the rise of 
worldwide industrial productive relations linked to Fordism which entailed a much stronger role for 
state intervention in managing the economy.111 These emerging economic ideas would be used to 
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enhance the power of nascent elites in Latin America and provide an atmosphere convivial to their 
further expansion despite their small number. Gramsci was attentive to the manner in which 
geographical interlinkages such as these were integral to passive revolutionary processes, highlighting 
how, in many cases: ‘the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local economic 
development...but is instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their 
ideological currents to the periphery - currents born of the productive development of the advanced 
countries.’112 In other words, the changing character of hegemony in the international political 
economy laid the foundations that were conducive for change in the character of hegemony at other 
spatial scales such as the regional and the national levels. This is not to say that the outcome of social 
struggle over the state form was pre-determined by the international sphere, merely that the terrain 
was created in which certain modes of development could be more favourably articulated. The social 
compromise that was ISI can be seen as a response to ‘activated’ subaltern classes but one in which 
these subaltern classes did not fully come to author the process themselves.113 Rather, populism 
combined nationalism with developmentalism in its rejection of the previous liberal, oligarchic model. 
However, populism was statist as opposed to socialist. Reformist, not revolutionary, and as a political 
project it appealed to the idea of social harmony rather than stressing class differences (for which 
appeals to nationalism helped provide the mediating ideology). Once again we can witness the role of 
the state in leading the process of change and mollifying more radical demands.   The shift to 
authoritarianism in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (largely in the southern cone) demonstrates 
well the example of further punctual moments of history spilling over into a regional setting. If it is 
impossible to write a history of Europe without the French Revolution, then it is equally impossible to 
write a history of Latin America without the Cuban Revolution. As Jorge Castañeda has noted, Cuba 
was the crucible of revolutionary activity for Latin America.114 The failure of populism to achieve its 
stated aims of developmental catch up, combined with fears of the Cuban example spreading through 
the continent, led many states to forge an alliance with international capital and the domestic 
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bourgeoisie to further expand capital accumulation.115 This led to a new intensified pressure to 
achieve rapid social change from above, without subaltern class participation. In effect the state had 
moved from a process of controlled inclusion to one of coerced marginalisation.116 
 
If the above examples paint in broad brush stroke about its universal applicability to different regions, 
a survey of recent literature (that is illustrative rather than exhaustive) reveals that the concept has 
indeed had purchase on a variety of historical and contemporary processes of state formation and in 
various contexts demonstrating the richness of its theoretical import on the ground (its geographical 
seats). Within Latin America passive revolution has been used to analyse the Mexican Revolution as 
well as the period of neoliberal restructuring following the 1982 debt-crisis.117 It has been applied to 
an understanding of Bolivian state formation since the Revolution of 1952, including that of the 
current Evo Morales administration.118  Marcos del Roio has sought to ‘translate’ passive revolution 
into the Brazilian context whilst Phillip Roberts has used the concept to explore the changing role of 
religion in Brazil’s development.119 Passive revolution has also been invoked to analyse the role of the 
Chilean Socialist Party (as part of the Concertación) in helping to construct neoliberalism in the post-
authoritarian era.120 Finally, Massimo Modonesi has used the concept to analyse the role left-of-centre 
governments associated with the Pink Tide phenomenon more generally in the region.121  In the 
European context, passive revolution has been used to explain the post-communist transition in in 
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Eastern Europe and the increasing role of transnational capital,122 and more recently the rise of the 
Justice and Development party in Turkey, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.123 In South–East Asia, 
Japan’s Meiji restoration has been viewed through the lens of passive revolution as have 
contemporary Chinese labour struggles.124 Finally, with regards to Africa, at a regional level, the 
general trend of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been interpreted as a passive revolution as 
have the specific cases of state formation in South Africa under the African National Congress (ANC) 
and most recently Malawi.125  
 
These separate analyses speak for themselves in showing the diverse applicability of passive 
revolution (and as such should be read for their own merits). What can be discerned here is an 
affirmative answer as to whether the concept has purchase in explaining concrete situations beyond its 
initial historical formulation (as Gramsci predicted). It is, however, instructive to note that when 
initially developed by Gramsci, passive revolution was used to describe the origins of European 
capitalism as well as its intensification following the rise of Fordism. In recent years, however, it has 
undoubtedly gained more purchase as a mode of analysing peripheral capitalist spaces (as the above 
examples indicate). Instead, European state formation post the 2008 financial crisis has been analysed 
in terms of the shift towards ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, as a response to the crisis of legitimacy of 
capitalist states.126 An open question will be whether the longer-term response to this crisis, which has 
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seen the so-called ‘return of the state’,127 will augur a new wave of passive revolution within the 
capitalist heartlands or whether the potential exists for a genuine subaltern hegemonic project. As 
Gramsci wisely indicated with regards to this, crises do not in and of themselves determine historical 




Given the way in which passive revolution has been inextricably tied to the broader notion of uneven 
and combined development, what then does this concept add that is not already present within the 
former notion?  In looking at the value of conjoining passive revolution to U&CD I believe three 
issues stand out, all of which are in some manner inter-related. 
 
First, the usage of passive revolution can overcome the criticism of U&CD as being aspatial. Rather 
than setting up a broad trans-historical method of abstract inquiry, passive revolution forces us to 
explore specific cases (the geographical seats) within the framework. Passive revolution becomes the 
political method of analysis where uneven development results in combination within a broader 
capitalist global political economy.  The very nature of the concept invites us to examine the 
peculiarities of national state formation linked to developments within the broader international 
context in a similar manner to U&CD itself. However, the originality here comes from the fact that 
passive revolution also enables us to explore the further ongoing consequences of uneven 
development that result from such a process, linked to the construction of hegemonic projects of new 
class alliances. The construction of state formation across multiple spatial scales is thereby revealed 
through this method.129 This was integral to Gramsci’s method and it is precisely what allowed him to 
see Fascism as the result of the unresolved class antagonisms embodied in the Italian Risorgimento.130 
Concurrent with Morton, ‘Beyond an initial ruptural feature of modern state formation, a passive 
                                                          
127 John Plender, ‘The Return of the State: how government is back at the heart of economic life’, Financial 
Times (21 August 2008). 
128 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.184 
129 Chris Hesketh, ‘Producing State Space in Chiapas: Passive Revolution and Everyday Life’ Critical 
Sociology, 42:2, (2016), pp. 211-228. 
130 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp67-68, Q19§24, 119-120, Q10I§9; see also Hesketh and 
Morton, ‘Spaces of Uneven Development’, for a discussion of Bolivia along a similar line. 
 28 
revolution has ongoing effects that subsequently shape the contingent and structural conditions of 
uneven and combined capitalist development.’131 
  
Second, with passive revolution there is a focus on class agency as opposed to only looking at the 
structural conditioning situation, something U&CD slides into quite easily.132 To misquote Eric Wolf , 
the type of grand narrative offered by U&CD can unfortunately translate into a story about ‘the 
international’ and the people without history.133 By contrast, passive revolution reverses this 
formulation.  As Peter Thomas rightly claims, passive revolution ‘analyses the formation of 
determining structures through the activity of the determinate social actors.’134 It reveals the political 
strategies of the state, therefore, in authoring such forms of class transition. However, this is not 
simply a narrative of despair and resigned fatalism that speaks to a timeless element of the human 
condition. As Gramsci reminds us “’the conception remains a dialectical one – in other words, 
presupposes, indeed postulates as necessary, a vigorous anti-thesis which can present intransigently 
all its potentialities for development.’135 In declaring that passive revolution is a universal concept we 
also need to explore the other side of this coin which is the active revolution or anti-passive 
revolutionary tactics of subaltern struggles.136 
 
This leads to the final advantage of deploying the term passive revolution – namely that it is more 
instantly politicised than U&CD. As noted above, it is concerned first and foremost with the 
institutionalisation or expansion of capitalism. This means that it necessarily relates to recent history 
and the immediate present as engaged critique (as opposed to a trans-historical social theory with 
largely academic value). Passive revolution draws our attention to the state form as an object of 
criticism and thus can aid our understanding of political struggle, not so much in providing an answer 
to Lenin’s famous question of ‘What is to be done?’ but rather in offering a strategic orientation as to 
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what is to be avoided. As well as an interpretation of history, passive revolution is also a warning 
from history, and forewarned is forearmed. Against a so-called passive revolution, what is needed is 
an anti-passive revolution or an active revolution. Stephen Gill has argued that the concepts passive 
revolution and hegemony should be thought of as ‘end-points in a continuum of actual historical (and 
indeed possible) transformations.’137 Passive revolution therefore refers less to the strength of a 
dominant class, but rather the weakness of their adversaries in forming alternatives.138 The 
construction of subaltern hegemony is therefore an imperative task. However, the challenge of how to 
do this needs to be informed by the logic of passive revolution. This requires that to go back to the 
fundamental Marxist critique of the state as a special type of organisation that is super-imposed upon 
society rather than subordinate to it.139 What one must examine therefore is whether social struggles 
are reconstituting society as society or in fact reconstituting the power relations of the state.140 The 
words of Henri Lefebvre are prescient here. Although he never used the specific term passive 
revolution, he nevertheless usefully points to the dangers of it, warning social movements of ‘the 
triple trap of substitution (of authority for grassroots action), transfer (of responsibility from activists 
to the ‘leaders’) and displacement (of the objectives and the stakes of social protest to the goals set by 
the ‘bosses’ who are attached to the established order.’141  
 
Where does this leave social movements and those wishing to affect change? As suggested earlier in 
the article, one crucial element is to make the concept of passive revolution an element of culture, 
beyond professional intellectuals. Beyond this we may also think about coming full circle to the 
relationship between Trotsky and Gramsci. Whereas the article started with Trotsky and U&CD, 
before moving on to discuss Gramsci and the manner in which passive revolution complements this 
                                                          
137 Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order 2nd edition. (Basinstoke: Palgrave, 2008), p. 
58. 
138 Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, p. 204). 
139 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in David McLellan (ed) Karl Marx: selected writings 2nd 
edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Vladamir Ilyich Lenin, ‘The State and Revolution’, in Henry 
M. Christman (ed), Essential Works of Lenin (New York: Dover Publications 1987), p.301. 
140 Henri Lefebvre, The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production, trans. Frank 
Bryant) (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), p.125. 
141 Henri Lefebvre ‘Space and State’. in Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones and Gordon Macloed, (eds), 
State/Space: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 96, emphases added. 
 30 
theoretical notion to analyse capitalist modernity. I would now suggest that if we are to put an end to 
passive revolution as a universal characteristic of modernity then it requires that its antithesis be 
developed to the maximum possibility. An active revolution that reaches beyond borders must be 
based in something akin to what Trotsky called a ‘permanent revolution’. The modalities of how such 
a permanent revolution could and should be enacted remain, of course, another discussion entirely. 
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